letes often become dependent on their agents or that the agents become deeply entrenched in their clients' personal lives. For example, clients may look to their agent for guidance in personal business matters, such as how to invest their money and make other financial decisions. 3 Similarly, most sports agents definitions do not indicate the vast skill base that agents must possess in order to effectively represent their clients. Though there are many important agenting skills, knowing how to effectively negotiate is perhaps the most important skill that a sports agent can possess. 4 Negotiating a good contract directly affects an agents' salary, because an agent receives a commission that is usually based on between two and five percent of the contract and with additional percentage for any endorsement contracts. 5 Many sports agents have a legal background, enabling them to competently navigate complex contract provisions. It could be argued that attorney-agents receive valuable training in law school that non-attorney agents never learn, including ethical training. For this reason, many argue that an attorney-agent is more beneficial to a client than a non-attorney-agent. 6 Yet, clients still channel their inner Rod Tidwell, yelling, "Show me the money!" regardless of the agents' skill set. 7 This paper advocates that these arguably shortsighted athletes need to pay more attention to the educational backgrounds of their agents and less attention to the almighty dollar.
VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. IAw JOuRNAL
Vainisi even referred to agents as "parasites." 14 Additionally, many team owners and fans believe that player greed, encouraged by agents, is ruining professional sports.1 5 Efforts have been made to enact federal legislation to regulate sports agents, but such legislation is not binding on states. 16 Each professional league and players' union is left to ensure that agents meet an ethical standard and that they act in a manner that is in the best interest of sports.' 7
II. THE EVOLUTION OF SPORTS AGENTS IN PLAYER NEGOTIATIONS

A. History
Today's agents need to be creative when negotiating player bonuses, no-trade clauses, guaranteed contracts and multi-year deals. The career of each athlete is relatively short, and players rely on agents to get the most money possible in order to ensure financial security for the future. 1 8 In this atmosphere, agents must walk a fine line of being as hardnosed as possible, while still considering the best long term strategy for their clients and actual producing an ethically viable deal. In the short-term working with teams concerned about the bottom line may prove difficult, but in the long run this strategy will probably yield the best return for the players. Additionally, through negotiation methods like "Final Offer Arbitration," agents may negotiate for intangible and interest-based benefits such as single occupancy rooms during road trips, higher food allowances, and the use of private jets, which will reward the player for his hard work and skills without bleeding a league dry. 1 Because contemporary deals are often legally complex, there is an ever-increasing need for competent, reliable and trust-worthy sports agents. Nevertheless, this modern framework is perhaps not emphasized enough to athletes, whose sports contracts can potentially involve millions of dollars. These provisions have not always been so lucrative, partly due to the fact that players in the past commonly negotiated their own contracts. 2 0 These athletes did not possess the knowledge to negotiate their own contracts and could not hire people with the proper knowledge to help them. 21 Players in every sport had to fight in order to win the right to negotiate contracts and obtain agent representation. 22 Baseball players were among the first to use agents, and other sports leagues slowly caught onto the trend. 23 By looking at examples from the past, one can see just how valuable good agents are and why collaborative negotiations often yield greater long-term return than adversarial negotiations.
B. Specific Examples of Past Player-League Negotiations
Major League Baseball ("MLB") player and Hall of Fame inductee Ralph Kiner played during the 1940s and 1950s, when there were no agents or attorneys to assist players in negotiating contracts. 24 Negotiations took place strictly between a player and his team's general manager. 25 In that era, a player signed a baseball VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAc. 5, 11 (2003) ("In negotiation for settlement agreements, the parties can fashion creative solutions .... Players are more inclined to settle because they can contract to secure benefits such as bonuses, no trade clauses, guaranteed contracts, multi-year deals, or other more imaginative clauses including single occupancy rooms on road trips, or initial payment of hotel charges rather than reimbursement.").
20. See SHROPSHIRE contract for life and not for a specified period of time. 2 6 Because no-trade clauses did not yet exist, a player had three choicesagree to the contract, be traded, or not play baseball. 27 In 1952, Kiner challenged these norms by arriving to a MLB Executive Council meeting with his attorney. 28 However, at the meeting the Executive Council prohibited the attorney from becoming involved in the negotiation. 29 Kiner responded by walking out of the room, and a lengthy bargaining impasse soon followed. 30 This "take it or leave it" style of negotiating created a lack of player autonomy, and eventually in 1966, baseball players formed the MLB Players' Association in order to protect the rights to their careers. 3 1 In 1970, the Players' Association negotiated for its players to the right to select the agents that could represent them during their individual contract negotiations. 3 2 Other leagues slowly followed, as Baseball was not the only sport in which professional players needed a sports agent. 33 [Vol. 17: p. 91 team. 3 6 Following a meeting with the Oilers' management, Cannon sent a letter to the Rams stating he no longer wished to remain a Ram and returned the money he had been given. 37 The Rams sought an injunction to prevent Cannon from playing in the AFL. 38 The Court allowed Cannon to breach his contract, stating that because he was "without counsel or advice and the whole transaction ... was completed in less than 48 hours," the actions of Cannon and the Rams did not create a binding contract. 39 The Southern District of California found that "amateur athletes need agent representation in order to protect their interests and match the negotiating skill of a general manager or member of a professional team." 40 Historically, coaches and sports leagues have been wary of working with sports agents, perhaps because sports agents empower their players, helping them get more money and benefits than the leagues would like to give. 41 For example, Jim Ringo, a 1960s allpro center for the National Football League's ("NFL") Green Bay Packers needed to negotiate a new contract early in his career. 42 Ringo brought an agent with him to a 1963 meeting with legendary Packer's coach Vince Lombardi. 43 Though teams may not like dealing with agents, agents are now a usual and essential part of any professional athlete's life. Nevertheless, there exists a potential for agents to earn large commissions at the expense of their clients and against the interest of the player's team. The only possible solution is to better train agents in collaborative negotiations and to create a code of strict ethical regulations, which will force agents to work more with sports leagues instead of against them.
C. The Expanding Role of Sports Agents and Their
Questionable Ethical Practices
Sports Agent Training and Responsibilities
Competition among sports agents has created an intense pressure to successfully negotiate contracts for big-name athletes. 46 Although, the original function of sports agents was to negotiate contracts for players, the role of the agent has greatly expanded. 47 Many agents now serve as financial managers, public relations specialists, investment as well as tax experts, and legal counsel, all of which require agents to perform specific functions, including the following:
Sports agents provide a variety of functions on behalf of players, including (1) Determining the value of a player's services; (2) Negotiation of the player's contract with the club, including salary, incentives, bonuses, guarantees, no-trade clauses, and length of contract; (3) Soliciting and arranging product endorsements, speaking engagements, and other uses of the player's name and image for commercial purposes; (4) Promoting the athlete's career through public relations, media coverage, and charitable activities; (5) Providing financial management services; (6) Resolving conflicts that arise concerning areas such as enforcement of employment contracts, and behavioral problems such as substance abuse;
(7) Representing players in salary or grievance arbitration matters; The competition for these athletes has intensified to the extent that many agents have become willing to do whatever it takes to corral college athletes into signing an agency contract before they have finished college or officially declared themselves professionals" With these expanded roles, there are several values to attending law school prior to becoming an agent. These attributes including the chance to develop a "trained eye to catch small but important contract details that might not be in the best interests of your client. '49 More specifically, and agent with legal training as a transactional attorney may benefit pro athletes with "property sales and purchases, investment oversight, formulation of trust, wills, and LLCs, prenuptials, and other needs that high-income earners may have." 50 The non-attorney-agent may not possess the same skill set to help safeguard the athlete's assets. 5 1 Too often, there are stories of athletes who made millions of dollars and squandered the money before the end of their careers, because these athletes didn't have the instruction of a trained professional to help them make better financial and life choices and any agent in their life may not taken the appropriate steps to help them. 52 Another big problem with non-attorney agents is that outside of passing a licensing test, sports agents licensing requires little to no requirements or background checks. This problem, in turn, creates the problem of inability to seek redress against negligent nonattorney agents. Agent licensing does not provide training sessions or specific ethical instructions. Unlike state bar associations that conduct rigorous background and character checks on each lawyer before admitting them, a players' association may not take the time or resources to conduct a comprehensive investigation. 53 Similarly, 48. Id. ("However, a single person rarely provides all of the functions. It is not uncommon for the agency function to be bifurcated into a single agent handling all aspects of negotiations on behalf of players .. .while another agent or firm handles financial management and planning tasks.").
49. Jack Bechta, Two Paths to Becoming an Agent, NAT ven though the players associations have taken great steps forward to protect their members, the industry of sports agentry is devoid of systematically enforceable regulations, which truly dictate minimum levels of professional expertise or accountability."). agent licensing does not include any assessment of skill level or character. Last, because of the sparse standards and nominal set expectations for non-attorney agents, is that it is more difficult to sue a non-attorney agent. If no expectations are set, it becomes hard to prove a non-attorney agent did not perform an adequate job.
Conversely, attorneys have strict codes of professional conduct. A professional athlete may have greater redress against an attorneyagent in a malpractice action than against a non-attorney-agent. 54 Thus, for the time being, athletes can better protect themselves by hiring attorney agents, so that they can seek redress if something goes wrong in their negotiations. As this paper will later argue, such a step would remain unnecessary if an overarching sports code was created that would sanction inappropriate agent behavior and protect athletes regardless of whether their agent was or was not an attorney.
The Unethical Side of Sports Agenting
Ethics play a large part in the agent industry. 55 Unfortunately, for clients with "non-attorney" agents, there are no mandated ethical codes of conduct. 56 Furthermore, there is dispute among attorney-agents as to whether they should be held to the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility when their non-attorney agent counterparts are not. 57 This view, however, has not been shared by some courts, which have held that "[a] s long as a lawyer is engaged in the practice of law, he is bound by the ethical requirements of that profession, and he may not defend his actions by contending that he was engaged in some other kind of professional activity. standard may place attorney-agents at a marketplace disadvantage to their "non-attorney-agent counterparts" who are not held to such ethical rules. 5 9 The amount of money typically made by professional athletes has caused several agents to go to unscrupulous measures to make the most money possible. 60 In some instances, agents are not interested in the best possible playing scenario for their client, but instead, how they personally can make the most money. 6 1 Depending on the collective bargaining agreement of the league, agents stand to make anywhere from two to five percent commission on a player's negotiated contract. 62 Besides the general perils of negotiation and agent-league relations, collective bargaining agreements present another potential contractual hindrance for players and agents. 64 In a typical collective bargaining agreement, an individual player gives up the free-59. See Geisel, supra note 16, at 226 (observing that attorney-agents are held to higher standard than non-attorney agents).
60. See Bryan Couch, How Agent Competition and Corruption Affects Sports and the Athlete-Agent Relationship and What Can Be Done to Control It, 10 SETON HALLJ. SPORT L. 111, 118 (2000) ("The only concern was the almighty dollar, both for the player and the agent, which turns athletics into a business full of overpaid egomaniacs more concerned with the best contract or endorsement deal than with the game itself."). Because of limits on the amount of an agent's commission, some agents resort to lies and exaggeration in order to steal clients from other agents. Collective bargaining agreements express the complete range of relationships between management and their athlete employees. This document will specify the scope of the union-management agreement and will prohibit the use of either strikes or lockouts. Although the collective bargaining agreement will vary with the sport, it will cover at a minimum the following: club discipline, non-injury grievances, commissioner discipline, injury grievances, the SPK, college draft, option clauses, waivers, base salaries, access to personnel files, medical rights, retirement, insurance and the duration of the [collective bargaining agreement].
dom to contract for him or herself "for the good of the group. '
"65
Salary terms and other conditions of employment bind all members of the collective bargaining unit under the terms of one contract. 66 Therefore, an existing collective bargaining agreement constrains the ability of an agent to negotiate for an individual player, and thus, they can create tensions between one player and the rest of the team, since additional money given to one player takes money away from his teammates. 67 An example of one such constraint is the NFL's rookie pool. 68 In the NFL rookie pool, the NFL establishes an amount of money that may be used for first-year players. 69 In this rookie pool, while agents are helpful in negotiating roster or signing bonuses, the collective bargaining agreement uses a de facto slotted pay scale. 70 This scale "involves paying draft choices the same amount of money received by the player drafted in the same position or slot in the previous draft, plus a percentage raise to reflect inflation. '' 71 An agent who touts that he or she can get an NFL draftee the most amount of money is not being entirely truthful with the client, because the funds are coming from a finite pool that is largely predetermined based on draft number; perhaps the agent could negotiate for a contract that offered more than the team originally intended, but each team still has a salary cap. 72 These situations can become tense, as agents try to wrestle more [Vol. 17: p. 91 money away from the league and the team. Additionally, agents in these situations may resort to adversarial or deceptive tactics to try get as much money as possible in the short-term for their clients and also to make the client think that all money and benefits received were solely because of his negotiating. Agents need to be held accountable for all unethical practices that arise in these situations, and this paper suggests that perhaps the best way to hold agents accountable would be by developing an industry-wide sports agent's ethical code. 73 Below are specific examples of other ethical problems that have already arisen in the sports arena.
One questionable practice of agents is encouraging clients to opt out of contracts that they didn't negotiate in favor of new contracts in which the agent would collect a hefty commission. 7 4 One situation in which this arguably occurred was with football player Terrell Owens and his acquired agent, Drew Rosenhaus. 75 In 2005, Terrell Owens was a star wide receiver for the Philadelphia Eagles. 7 6 Attorney Drew Rosenhaus became Owens' agent in the middle of his contract and, as a result, did not collect any commission from that deal. 77 Rosenhaus convinced Owens he was not being paid fair market value in order to entice him to holdout until a new contract was offered. 7 8 The Eagles refused to renegotiate the contract, and Owens and Rosenhaus' actions proved to be a major distraction to the team. 79 
How Necessary Is a Sports Agent?
Players are constantly expecting more from their agents, but many do not realize that a contract has very little to do with the agent's negotiating talents. 8 2 It is the player's success on the field, court, or ice, rather, that leads to a more lucrative contract. 8 3 Certified baseball and basketball agent Keith Kreiter commented, "Every contract is just a form agreement. My plummer [sic] could negotiate a first-round pick's contract as good as the next negotiator in the country can." '8 4 On the other hand, some players and coaches feel that they don't have the required business acumen to negotiate their own contract. 8 have zero knowledge when it comes to the business aspect of things." 86 Mostly, the market for an athlete in a sports league is largely a result of team needs and how a team views the free-agent marketplace. 8 7 However, agents sometimes misread the marketplace, at great costs to their clients. 8 8 For example, baseball player Manny Ramirez overestimated the demand for his skills and damaged his prospects as a result. 89 In 1998, he turned down several lucrative short-term offers based on the advice of his agent Scott Boras, who was convinced that Manny could get a four-or-five year contract. 9°A s of February 2009, with Manny unsigned, it became clear that he would not receive the massive contract he initially sought. 91 Subsequently in March 2009, Ramirez signed a two-year, $45 million contract with the Los Angeles Dodgers, including a whopping $25 million of deferred monies. 92 Though, it is important to note that while an athlete's skills are the most important factor in the athlete's contractual power, athletes still need advice on the legal matters involved in creating those contracts. 9 3 As NBA superstar LeBron James discovered, agents 86 need to be available to athletes to make sure the athletes' contracts and finances are protected and soundly invested. 94 In 2005, LeBron James shocked the league when he fired his agent and hired three friends to take over management duties. 9 5 As one of the most popular, lucrative, and visible athletes in the world, NBA management was worried about how three highly inexperienced young men would manage James's career. 96 At the time, LeBron said that he "wanted to give his friends a chance to create a professional legacy beyond being flunkies and hangers-on. '9 7 James, however, who has companies fighting for his signature on sponsorship deals, soon realized the need for an attorney-agent. 98 In addition to the team of legal, financial, and public relations professionals associated with LeBron's friend-run marketing empire, he has now retained the services of Leon Rose, a well-known attorney-agent. 99 When hundreds of millions of dollars are on the line, a professional athlete's affairs cannot be left to inexperience, chance and friendship. 10 0 Also illustrating the need for an attorney-agent in the contract negotiation process is baseball superstar Gary Sheffield.' 0 son." 10 2 Sheffield decided that rather than hire a new agent, he would serve as his own agent. 1 0 3 In doing so, Sheffield potentially left millions of dollars on the table and in his new contract he failed to negotiate a no-trade clause for himself.' 0 4 Without this clause, a team signing Sheffield could trade him at any time without his consent, which is exactly what the New York Yankees did in 2006.105
All of these examples show that, even though a players' skill is his best selling point, agents are still necessary to ensure that the player is protected, compensated and remains in the sport as long as possible. Though agents often overestimate and overstate their power in contract negotiation to their clients, they still have value and are necessary to athletes to explain legal, contractual, financial and other concepts. Players should be aware of all of this in order to choose the best agent and make the best career choices. In fact, a competent agent, among other things would most likely explain this to his client and would not "hide the ball" in regard to important decisions.
Current Hindrances to Proper Agent Conduct
The best agents "can and should be able not only to provide the player with the information necessary to evaluate and reject a low offer but also to push the team to its upper limit or highest offer." 1 0 6 However, on another level involving ethical dealings, many agents seek to foster a sense of dependency in their clients: "They don't want players to be able to think for themselves. It's sort of like an addiction to drugs. A lot of things that normal people do in the course of life, they never experience because they have somebody doing it for them."' 1 7 As a result, agents who adhere to an ethical code risk being pushed out of the business by more unethical or nefarious agents, and thus risk losing their clients to other agents. 10 8 This situation is yet another ethical problem which needs further evaluation and which could be solved through standard industry ethical rules. The current system provides no protection or incentive for agents who follow the "rules," that is those who act ethically even in the absence of established ethical rules. In the current system, even though stealing clients could potentially form the basis of a tort claim for interference with contractual relations, these suits are not usually brought, because "stealing clients" has become industry standard. 1 0 9 In Speakers of Sport, Inc. v. Proserv, Inc., the Seventh Circuit stated, "There is in general nothing wrong with one sports agent trying to take a client from another if this can be done without precipitating a breach of contract." 110 The circuit court noted that fierce competitiveness is the cornerstone of the free market economy."' Except in extreme circumstances, agents are not disciplined for soliciting another agent's clients.' 12 Even if a court or players union tries to bring charges against a poaching agent, these are difficult to prove, and players have little incentive to complain about an unethical agent." 13 Often, "players have no interest in testifying against their current agent who improperly solicited and stole them from their previous agent," especially when the poaching agent has treated them to fancy dinners and lavish gifts. 1 4 However, an agent's peers would have an incentive to report their fellow agents who have been stealing clients from them. However, this seldom happens because agents are hesitant to "rat" on each other. But when agents do report each other, it can have devastating effects, as it did with agent David Dunn. The example of Dunn shows how implementing a devastating rule governing client stealing would dissuade agents from engaging in such action and would therefore provide greater protection for athletes. advisor must take a test and fulfill other essential requirements. 23 The test has questions based on the collective bargaining agreement, the salary cap and the free agency system. 1 24 Potential agents who fail this exam may be suspended or decertified by the NFL Players Association. 12 5 In addition to NFL, some states have agent regulation acts aimed at protecting student-athletes. 126 Many rookie athletes are too trusting and vulnerable when negotiating their first contract with an agent.1 27 One problem is that if an agent is not an attorney, a player cannot bring suit against the agent for malpractice. 1 28 Although, a players union may require an agent to carry professional liability insurance, the NFL Players' Association is the only player's union to require an agent to carry malpractice insurance. 129 The National Collegiate Athletic Association's ("NCAA") guidelines. specify that a student-athlete may receive advice from an attorney regarding a proposed professional contract, but that attorney may not represent the athlete in negotiation.1 3 0 123. See id. at 10-14 (providing requirements for becoming NFL agent). Individuals wishing to be certified as NFL agents must now have a master's degree. Id. Other certification requirements include: a $1,650.00 application fee, passing the NFLPA test, attendance at a two (2) day seminar in Washington, DC, and successful completion of a written, proctored examination. Id. Following successfully passing the exam, the agent must obtain professional liability insurance from an approved carrier. Id.; see also 
Agents Representing Multiple Clients
A conflict of interest occurs when a duty owed to one party is "compromised by a separate interest or agreement with a third party." 31 Conflicts of interest may arise if an agent represents multiple players who play the same position, or play for the same team, and both are trying to negotiate contracts. 1 3 2 In 1996, attorneyagent David Falk faced this problem when he represented top basketball playerJuwan Howard and tried to negotiate a deal with the NBA's Miami Heat. 1 33 When the deal fell through, Falk secured a contract for Howard with the Washington Bullets. 134 In doing so, Falk neglected one of his average players, Rex Chapman, who wanted to re-sign with the Miami Heat and was unable to do so. 1 35 If an agent gets a higher contract for one player, it may cause a rift in his or her relationship with another player, or may slight the average player in favor of the superstar client. 13 6 In the case of rookie NFL players, an agent may try to negotiate two or more contracts from a finite pool of money, because when one player takes up more salary cap room less money is available for the other player. 137 Such an example occurred in 2006 when quarterback Jay Cutler entered the NFL draft from Vanderbilt University.' 3 8 He hired James "Bus" Cook, a licensed attorney, to represent him.' 39 Cutler and his family told Cook that they did not want Cook to represent another top quarterback, a reasonable request for a player desiring his agent to look out for his best inter-131. SHROPSHIRE Furthermore, it is part of an agent's job to ensure that a client is drafted as high as possible. 151 An agent helps develop the buzz around a player. 1 52 The higher the player is drafted, the more lucrative his contract. 1 53 In the Clemens-Sanchez instance, not only is one agent representing two clients on the same roster, but also two quarterback clients who are vying to be the starter! 1 5 4 When does representing one client take away from zealous advocacy on behalf of another? Not only are players contracted through a finite pool of money, but also, in this instance, only one of the players can win the starting quarterback job. 155 In conclusion, there are many situations in which an agent cannot adequately represent two clients, because the interests of the clients are directly adverse. In these situations, the clients would benefit from an ethical rule similar to the attorney ethical conflict rule that forbids an agent to act in these situations. Such a rule should be created to best protect professional athletes.
The Importance of Trust In Agent-Client Relationships
The relationship between athlete and agent is based on trust. 1 56 Most athletes spend a great deal of time evaluating representatives in attempting choose the right one. 157 sometimes vetting is not enough and athletes often find themselves misguided, misled and defrauded. 58 Picking the wrong agent can adversely affect the rest of an athlete's life, wasting the athlete's life's work and earnings and threatening his family's welfare. For example, one agent named Richard Sorkin who could not properly manage his clients' affairs greatly damaged their careers and finances. Sorkin was a sportswriter turned non-attorney agent who represented more than fifty NHL and NBA players in the 1970s. 15 9 Sorkin "squandered an estimated $1.2 million of his clients' money, much of it on his own gambling and stock market ventures." 160 In 1978, Sorkin pleaded guilty to seven counts of grand larceny and was sentenced to three years in prison) 6 1 Sorkin is not alone, as he is just one among a number of agents who have utilized a position of trust with their clients in order to bilk millions of dollars from the client. 162 In other cases, conflicts with agents result in lawsuits, as was the case with late Hall of Fame NFL player, Reggie White, who spent eight years as a defensive end for the Philadelphia Eagles. 16 -During his time with the Eagles, non-attorney agent Patrick Forte represented White. 164 While Forte was negotiating a new contract between White and the Eagles, he was also negotiating on his own behalf to become an assistant to Eagles' president, Harry Gamble. 1 65 White filed suit in U.S. District Court seeking $1.5 million from Forte. 166 option year on his contract. 167 White charged that Forte "pursued his [Forte's] employment with the Eagles at the same time that he was ostensibly representing the best interests of White." 168 The suit was later dropped after White was able to come to a contract agreement with the Eagles, but his relationship with the team was irreparably cracked. 169 In 1993, this fissure came to a head when White left the Eagles as a free agent to join the Green Bay Packers. 170 William "Tank" Black is another example of a non-attorney sports agent who allowed greed and unethical behavior to interfere with the job he was hired to perform. 17 ' Black was certified as a player-agent with both the NFL and NBA. 1 7 2 Yet, he misappropriated more than $14 million from his clients.' 7 3 Black was convicted in Florida of fraud, conspiracy, and obstruction of justice charges, for which he spent five years in prison. 174 If consistent professional rules of conduct were in place for sports agents, there would be set ethical standards to which every player representative would be held. 79 With sports being a multibillion dollar industry, agents must be held more accountable in order to protect athletes' best interests. 180 Bad business advice may leave an athlete unprepared to wisely invest the money he or she has earned during his or her playing days, money that in many cases must last for the duration of the athlete's life. 181 Several states have passed legislation to require agent registration.' 82 Enforcement by states, however, has been "uneven and unpredictable."' 183 Agent regulation continues to be a business and legal battleground.1 84 B. Negotiating Styles, Nice vs. Ruthless
Although attorney-agents are arguably held to a higher standard than non attorney-agents, because of their mandatory adherence to the ABA's ethics code, there are still two very distinct approaches when lawyer-agents represent athletes. Both yield results, but only one approach actively seeks long-term collaborative relationships between agents and teams. The other is a more aggressive short-term, adversarial approach. In this section, these two approaches are contrasted. After analyzing these two styles, one can see why professional sports all need an overarching set of ethical rules to regulate their agents and arguably, why these rules should perhaps be even more extensive than attorney ethical rules. 183. See SHROPSHIRE & DAVIs, supra note 5, at 142 (addressing impact of agency statutes and problems with regulation). Major problems with agency regulation include a "pervasive lack of enforcement in some states," and "apathy toward the lack of registration by popular sports agents." Id.
184. See id. at vii (discussing business and legal "aspects that impact sports agents."). The examples below will show that even though attorneys have professional rules, there are cases where attorney-agents act unethically in the sports arena and there is no on-point rule that sanctions them. Therefore, even though attorney-agents are more regulated than non-attorney agents, greater steps need to be taken to create sports-focused regulations.
Ron Shapiro: The Power of Nice
Ron Shapiro, a cum laude graduate of Harvard Law School, has been a sports agent for more than thirty years. 18 In addition, Shapiro goes to the negotiating table prepared and able to support his contract requests. In negotiating a contract between Brooks Robinson and the Baltimore Orioles, Shapiro read, dug, scoured, researched, referenced, and cross-referenced in order to learn everything he could about the Orioles. 193 Shapiro believes that with preparation, it is possible for both sides to emerge from negotiations as winners, and has stated that, "If all you have in your toolbox is a hammer, then every problem looks like a nail. The same holds true for negotiation. More tools enable you to solve more problems.
94
Further, when an agent is able to build a long-term relationship with team management, the two sides are likely to return to the negotiating table with other athletes.' 95 Shapiro believes that effective negotiating develops relationships, which will lead to more deals. "If you burn bridges, destroy the other side, squeeze the last buck out, 'take no prisoners,' you can't expect the other party to want to do business with you again. They'll run from the negotiating table, let alone consider returning to it."196 To Shapiro, negotiation is not a zero sum game, in which one side has to win and the other side loses. 197 "Zero sum" situations are those where ... [T] here is no incentive to co-operate with opponents because every inch given to them is an inch lost. The idea of the zero-sum game is modified by the introduction of the possibility of change in the nature of the game while it is being played. Hence, for instance, companies that are fighting for market share are playing a zero-sum game if they see that market as fixed. But if the market is continually ... the players are playing a game in which they can have a declining share of a bigger cake and still see their businesses grow.
Id.
198. SHAPIRO &JANKOWSKI, supra note 187, AT 27. 199. See id. at 231 (explaining importance of relationships and bonding).
[Vol. 17: p. 91 likely to let the impasse stand." 20 0 "Every negotiation takes place in an environment ....
It means the feelings, sensitivities, tensions, fears, and hopes that comprise the atmosphere of negotiation. They make up the environment as much, or moreso, [sic] than the four walls, table, and chairs." 20 1 Strong, respectful relationships can accomplish what mere acquaintanceships cannot. Shapiro's relationship with his client, Cal Ripken, has lasted since Ripken was a teenager because Shapiro treats Ripken with consideration, and tries to meet his real needs. 20 2 When Cal Ripken was an up-and-coming baseball player, at the young age of eighteen, many agents sought to represent him. 203 These agents promised Ripken that they could get him to the big leagues faster, get him more endorsements, or get him more money. 20 4 They took him to fancy dinners and drove him around in limousines in order to try to persuade Ripken to hire them. 20 5 Ron Shapiro's approach with Ripken differed from that of the other agents. 20 6 Rather than trying to catch his eye with expensive gifts and a fancy lifestyle, Shapiro merely invited Ripken to his office. 207 Instead of promising him the moon, Shapiro listened to what Ripken wanted and needed. 20 8 Ripken, in turn, has spoken quite highly of Shapiro, saying that with an agent like Shapiro, "[m] ake no mistake, you'll outnegotiate the other side." 20 9 While Ripken acknowledges that many agents are "sharks," he proudly stands behind Ron Shapiro, proclaiming that he is not one of those agents. 2 10 Shapiro's negotiating techniques and treatment of his clients demonstrate that treating your client like an equal and a friend can win more clients than treating him like a prize to be won, and that treating your opponent as an equal, as opposed to an opponent in 200 war, helps establish relationships with clients. 21 1 In a "money talks," everything-is-a-sales-pitch world, Shapiro's techniques indicate that the money, glitz, and glamour are not everything. 2 12 He shows that personal relationships, respect, and money and career management are the key to success and longevity in a usually fleeting profession. 213 
Drew Rosenhaus: Proud to Be a Shark
Smarmy, arrogant, deceitful, a "cancer, a low life" these are some of the adjectives that have been used to describe NFL attorney-agent Drew Rosenhaus. 21 4 As a twenty-two-year-old graduate of the Duke University School of Law, Rosenhaus became the youngest certified NFL agent. 215 He works tirelessly for his clients. 2 16 He has negotiated over one billion dollars in player contracts. 2 17 Other sports agents, however, are irritated that "Rosenhaus is the brash public face of the business." 21 8
Unlike Shapiro, Rosenhaus's professional success has resulted from employing a take-no-prisoners negotiation style. 21 9 Rosenhaus openly describe himself as a shark, and he even owns and keeps a pet shark in his office. 2 20 The agent described the association between his style and the nature of sharks, saying, "A shark is a relentless predator that is goal-oriented and focused on its objective around the clock ....
It never rests, it never wavers, it is always on the clock. That's how we are." 2 21 211. For a further discussion about Shapiro's practices, see supra notes 193-201 and accompanying text.
212. See SHAPIRo &JANKOWSKI, supra note 187, at v-vii (discussing relationship between Ripken and Shapiro Rosenhaus has been accused of falsifying information and lying to improve his negotiation position; however, the NFL has never investigated Rosenhaus. 222 Former NFL attorney-agent Tim Irwin has said on separate occasions that "There is a cancer growing in our profession . . ." and that he would not permit Rosenhaus to represent his son. 223 Veteran NFL attorney-agent David Ware has also derided Rosenhaus' tactics, stating that "Drew tells a player that he's worth more money, that his agent is not doing enough for him, that he's better than the guy starting in front of him. Now the player is not only mad at his agent, he's mad at the team management. He sees the guy sitting in front of him as a coconspirator." 2 24
Rosenhaus would do almost anything to gain a competitive advantage over his fellow agents. 225 One of Rosenhaus's more criticized stunts came during the 2003 NFL draft with University of Miami running back Willis McGahee. 226 McGahee was projected as a top-five draft pick before tearing knee ligaments in the Fiesta Bowl. 22 7 With McGahee's draft prospects quickly slipping, and before a national television audience, McGahee's phone rang shortly before the end of the first round. 228 Rosenhaus was on the other end of the line, not a member of an NFL team intent on drafting McGahee. 2 29 This was a ploy to make teams believe that other teams were interested in McGahee. Since all of the other team administrations saw McGahee take the call they assumed another team was calling him. 230 McGahee was selected by the Buffalo Bills with the twenty-third pick of the draft. 2 31 Rosenhaus's adversaries said "such tactics destroy an agent's credibility . . . the best deals are made on mutual trust, not deception." 23 2 Rosenhaus, however, claims that "[t]he perception was manipulated to help Willis as much as I could." 233 Still, Rosenhaus prides himself on the personal touch and devotion he offers all his clients. 234 He does not think there is anything wrong with the way he represents his clients, and there are no rules that forbid most of the representation tactics he uses. He does not employ a secretary and Rosenhaus personally or his brother Jason, who is also a certified NFL agent, always answers his phones. 235 He is ready to play hardball at a moment's notice; as he has two cell phones on him at all times and the numbers of all NFL general managers on speed dial. 23 6 He works seven days a week, nineteen hours per day. 2 3 7 He is not married, has no children, and does not take vacations. 23 257. For a further discussion of Shapiro's approach as agent, see supra notes 185-213 and accompanying text.
258. See Burwell, supra note 244 ("unless Rosenhaus lands Rhett a substantially better deal than was previously negotiated last summer, Rhett wasted his time ything else, however he risks the consequences of his miscalculations and poor behavior. 2 59 IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF AGENT MISCALCULATIONS AND POOR BEHAVIOR Many athletes blindly accept their agents' advice, thinking that the agent is only looking out for their best interests, not realizing the agents other possible self concerns such as pride, image and money. These clients are often young and do not realize the possible damage that an agent can do. Additionally, many athletes act in the moment, not anticipating the possible future repercussions or rash or selfish behavior.
For a young and inexperienced athlete, an agent is a key figure in the transition from being an amateur to a professional. 2 60 "The athlete-agent relationship is typically one of unequal power: the agent dominates the athlete, who is completely dependent on the agent for business advice. '2 61 A young athlete is unprepared to make his own negotiations and often makes decisions about who will represent him based on nothing more than faith because he is unable to distinguish one agent's abilities from another's. 2 62 National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing ("NASCAR") driver Kyle Busch learned a tough lesson at a young age that not all agents are sufficiently forthright with their clients. 263 Busch was negotiating a contract extension with Hendrick Motorsports. 2 64 His attorney-agent, Allen Miller, "kept him in the dark" about how the negotiation process was going, while the process was going badly. 2 in favor of fellow driver Dale Earnhardt, Jr. 26 6 His agent diminished the number of racing groups that were interested in Busch's services through his hardball tactics and left Busch "very ignorant"; now not only did Busch not have a contract but he also had no clue what was going on. 26 7 Another possible example of bad agent advice and negotiating involves former MLB player Juan Gonzalez. 268 In 2000, Gonzalez turned down an eight-year, $140 million contract with the Detroit Tigers. 269 Once known as 'Juan Gone" for his power hitting, fans and commentators were left asking "where has Juan Gone?" 270 Whether it was the team, contract terms, or some other variable that led Gonzalez to reject the Tigers' offer, only Gonzalez knows. After turning down the Detroit contract, Gonzalez signed a oneyear deal with the Cleveland Indians to prove he was still one of baseball's best players. 2 71 After a string of injuries and bad luck, Gonzalez never again played to his potential and he never came close to achieving a $140 million deal. 2 72 Perhaps Gonzalez did not like Detroit and did not like the direction of the team. Gonzalez's attorney-agent, Scott Boras, said that Juan Gonzalez will turn down money in order to play in a place he wants to be, and he risk a lot to do so. 2 73 In 2007, New York Yankees third baseman, Alex Rodriguez, infuriated fans, coaches, fellow players, and MLB executives when, under the advisement of agent Scott Boras, he opted out of his Yankees contract during the pivotal Game Four of the World Series. 274 By using the championship-clinching game to announce his Because of the fears associated with agents, some athletes are again meeting with management one-on-one in order to get the best possible deal. 279 Negotiating for oneself also eliminates the hefty commissions paid to agents. Former University of Maryland basketball great Len Elmore noted:
In an environment where agents must constantly restate their value proposition, a majority of agents are going to be hard-pressed to prove fairly and comparatively how they enhance a player's bottom line or his overall career ....
The day has come when superstars can meet face-to-face with an activist owner and without an agent reach the basics of an agreement. 280 However, this perspective seems too drastic, as it ignores the possible benefits an agent can bring to an athlete. Perhaps a better solution is hiring an attorney on an hourly basis, instead on the basis of commission. Prominent players such as NBA basketball greats Tim Duncan and Grant Hill hire attorneys on an hourly basis to negotiate contracts, paying thousands of dollars, instead of millions for legal services. 2 1 Grant Hill's attorney, Lon Babby, charged him $100,000 to negotiate his first contract. 282 Had he paid the standard agent commission, Hill would have expended $1.8 million. 283 As Boston Celtic Ray Allen noted, hiring an attorney on an hourly basis is "merely a good business decision." 28 4 This solution appears to be a good one, and agents would be wise to note that their careers may be in danger unless they change their ways and begin to act ethically. An ethical code could help them do this.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The sports agent industry is largely "devoid of systematically enforceable regulations, which truly dictate minimum levels of professional expertise or accountability." 28 5 Sports leagues should enact a uniform regulation system, such as the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules").286 With no strict guidelines, the leagues essentially give sports agents unrestricted power in the way they operate. 28 7 Leagues could also benefit by enacting a continuing education program to ensure that agents are current with regard to the laws and practices of each league. 2 88 Players would be well advised to understand the differ-ence between attorney and non-attorney representatives. 289 The NFL now requires a graduate degree before an individual will be certified as a player agent. 290 This added emphasis on education should serve as a wake-up call to the professional athlete.
Attorneys have the educational background to have a better understanding of contracts, labor laws and tax ramifications. 29 1 An attorney-agent is bound by the Model Rules, and failure to comply with this code of ethics may result in disciplinary action. 292 This is not the case for the non-attorney agent. If attorney-agents were held to the Model Rules when participating in a field traditionally outside the bounds of law, a client would be better protected with respect to conflicts of interest. 293 Under Model Rule 1.7, "a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest." 294 However, an agent may represent two clients with competing interests if the client consents, the representation is not prohibited by law, the parities are not against each other, and the attorney reasonably believes that neither client's interests will be compromised as a result of the dual representation. 295 Since the same standard of ethics is not applied to the nonattorney agent as the attorney-agent, attorneys may be quick to cite unfairness in imposing one standard to them and another to their non-attorney counterparts. 297 At the time of this article, few courts have addressed whether an attorney acting as a sports agent is held to the Model Rules or any other ethical standards that would apply to an attorney in a traditional legal role. 298 "It may also be argued that the activities of a sports agent or an attorney may be indistinguishable, for which reason it is appropriate to adopt a policy which supports the application of the ethical code regardless of form." 299 In the absence of an established agents' ethical code, players may also be wise to retain licensed attorneys on a set fee instead of unlicensed representatives on a contingent fee. 300 While this may not be a popular approach with the certified sports agent, a player with a limited shelf life should welcome the opportunity to save millions of dollars. 30 1 Moreover, while the player may not longer receive the lavishing expensive gifts such as cars from their agents, the reality is, that with the millions of dollars saved by athletes utilizing an attorney on an hourly basis, the athlete can go out and buy ten cars. 30 2 30 3 Additionally, for tasks that an athlete feels he or she cannot handle on his/her own (such as travel arrangements, personal appearances, etc), the athlete can hire a personal assistant or manager at a fee far less than the commission on a contract. 30 302. See Couch, supra note 60, at 120-21 (naming Norby Walters and Lloyd Bloom as example of agents who have given large gifts, such as "clothing and airline tickets," to athletes).
303. See SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS, supra note 5, at 25-26 (giving example that one athlete's use of attorney saved him $1.8 million dollars).
304. See Couch, supra note 60, at 112 (listing many roles agents take on for clients). Also players, who have a short professional career, need to have an idea of how to successful move on with their life. However, agents, who are often more sophisticated in business, usually cultivate the dependency of the naive young athlete. 3 0 6 For many agents, once a client's playing career is over, the agent has no inclination to help a client with their mundane life activities. 30 7 Although most agents do not like Drew Rosenhaus, many recognize his tremendous talent for negotiating. 3 0 8 For example, NFL attorney-agent Mark Bloom filed a grievance with the NFL Players Association against Rosenhaus for interfering with clients. 30 9 Nonetheless, Bloom said, "I can't say I'd necessarily do things the way he does, but he gets results. His drive and his work ethic is real." 3 1 0 This fact, however, highlights that being a good negotiator alone is not always enough. Though Rosenhaus has often won success for his clients, he has also failed others. Rosenhaus may not have the "huge" successes that he has now if he worked more collaboratively and more ethically, but he would more effectively represent all of his clients instead of just a select group. Agents like Rosenhaus should be harnessed with ethical rules specific to sports in order to better protect all athletes and not just the best of the best. Otherwise, when agents participate in deceptive tactics, such as Rosenhaus's ploy with Willis McGahee, this approach "leaves too many clubs feeling vanquished rather than gratified, which is not the way an equal partner in negotiation should feel." 3 1 ' For some 305 team executives in the NFL, hearing that Rosenhaus is a player's agent may cause a collective groan and negative impression. 3 12 It is undeniable that both Drew Rosenhaus and Ronald Shapiro have been incredibly successful in their respective roles as NFL and MLB agent. 3 13 It would seem, however, that the Shapiro method of negotiation is a more welcome and sustainable one, as it emphasizes the importance of long-term relationships and mutuality in contracts. 3 14 This has been proven by the large number of MLB teams that seem to have no hesitation in negotiating with Shapiro because of his reputation. 315 While hiring Rosenhaus as an agent may not be an absolute deterrent to dealing with a player, some teams may hesitate when deciding whether or not to enter contract negotiations with "The Shark."
Negotiation is based on relationships. 3 16 Agents who pursue contracts that have the potential to lead to other contracts yield a larger return-on-effort. 3 17 Nonetheless, many negotiators approach a contract as a one-time deal; "Go in, score, get out." 3 1 8 Shapiro believes the most effective negotiating comes when you help the other side to achieve at least some of what they want. 31 9 This helps build relationships that can lead to an infinite number of future deals. 320 Players and owners generally agree that there is a problem in the player representation business. 322 "Lack of competence, client stealing, and overly aggressive negotiating tactics are all common ....
[E]veryone, including players, heads of the players associations, and even many agents, universally agrees that such behavior is a problem." 323 NFL Hall of Fame player Kellen Winslow Sr. said that anyone paying a three percent commission to his agent is being ripped off: "They have decided [to sign with an agent] because agents have sold them a bag of goods of what they can do for them." 3 24 This should remain as a word of caution to professional athletes to remain smart when deciding on their representation. 3 25 While acting as an agent, like anything else, is a business, agents need to remember that they are hired as a fiduciary and as an advocate for their clients.326
In the growing era of "show me the money," it would be wise for athletes to hire an attorney to help them maximize their potential earnings. However, this attorney cannot be just any attorney. He must be a well educated, well trained and ethical, and most importantly, he must seek to promote his client and not himself. As the late attorney-agent Mark McCormackfounder of IMG and the representative for Jack Nicklaus, Gary Player, Greg Norman, and Annika Sorenstam, among many othersonce said: "The client is the story, not the agent .... We make money by helping the client make money. The second you become more important than the client you represent is the moment you need to get out of this business." 
